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Abstract 
In this contribution, we propose that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
introduce ‘rule of law infringement procedures’, having both a fast-track and a freezing 
component, as part of a wider ‘EU rule of law toolbox’. We show rule of law infringement 
procedures’ great potential in tackling rule of law backsliding in the Member States, provided 
that the following rules are applied. First, the European Commission should identify the rule of 
law problem explicitly. Second, it should not waste time and postpone its legal actions, while a 
Member State openly violates the rule of law. Third, the CJEU should automatically prioritise 
and accelerate infringement cases with a rule of law element to avoid more harm being done 
by those in power. Fourth, interim measures should be used to put an immediate halt to rule 
of law violations that can culminate in grave and irreversible harm. Fifth, EU institutions should 
establish a periodic rule of law review. It should help them to determine if there is a systemic 
threat to the rule of law in a given Member State, and provide additional legitimacy to the 
European Commission for initiating rule of law infringement actions and to the CJEU for ruling 
on such matters. 
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Executive summary 
Under current treaty law, the EU has two main options to tackle rule of law violations in the 
Member States. It may initiate infringement proceedings or trigger the mechanism of Article 7 of 
the Treaty on European Union, relying predominantly on decisions by political institutions. We 
propose a way out of this conundrum, through ‘rule of law infringement procedures’, having both 
a fast-track and a freezing component, as part of a wider ‘EU rule of law toolbox’.  
We argue that infringement procedures are underused in the enforcement of the rule of law. We 
also demonstrate that infringement actions are much better suited to addressing systemic 
violations of EU law than preliminary rulings. The former may end with a finding that certain laws 
or practices are not compatible with EU law, while the latter procedure usually leaves the final 
assessment to national authorities, which may not be in a position to adequately weigh the gravity 
of systemic rule of law problems.  
We focus on the judicial phase of the infringement procedure and show its great potential to tackle 
rule of law issues in the Member States, provided that the following rules are applied. First, the 
European Commission should call a spade a spade, and identify the rule of law problem explicitly. 
Second, the European Commission should not waste time and postpone its legal actions, while a 
Member State openly violates the rule of law. Third, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) should automatically prioritise and accelerate infringement cases with a rule of law element 
to avoid more harm being done by those in power. Fourth, interim measures should be used to put 
an immediate halt to rule of law violations that can culminate in grave and irreversible harm. Fifth, 
European institutions should establish a periodic rule of law review. It should be devised as a 
regular, possibly annual supervision mechanism, based on contextual analysis of national laws and 
policies, a scientifically proven methodology, objective standards and equal treatment of all 
Member States. It should help EU institutions to determine if there is a systemic threat to the rule 
of law in a given Member State, and provide additional legitimacy to the European Commission for 
initiating rule of law infringement actions and to the CJEU for ruling on such matters.  
The above propositions are premised on the understanding that rule of law backsliding poses a very 
different challenge to the EU legal order than other failures of Member States to fulfil their 
obligations stemming from the Treaties. It implies systemic violations of common principles and 
values, and for that reason, it should be tackled systemically – by all available means, both legal and 
political. 
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1. Problem setting 
Today, one of the greatest challenges to the unity and stability of the European Union is posed 
by Member States violating the rule of law. In the EU, the rule of law is not only a common 
value, explicitly mentioned in Article 2 TEU, but also the foundation of the European integration 
process. Since 1993 it has been part of the Copenhagen (accession) criteria defining the 
eligibility of a country to join the European Union. Although it is often argued that the rule of 
law as a value, and a doctrinal concept, is far too general to be a basis for compliance 
assessment, some components of it recognised by all Member States are very specific. These 
core components were listed by the Council of Europe’s Commission for Democracy through 
Law (the Venice Commission) and include legality, legal certainty, equality before the law and 
non-discrimination, and access to justice.  
The phenomenon of rule of law backsliding received growing international and scholarly 
attention when blatant disregard of rule of law standards became evident in two Member 
States – Hungary (in 2010) and Poland (in 2015). Rule of law backsliding is defined as “the 
process through which elected public authorities deliberately implement governmental 
blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or capture internal checks on power 
with the view of dismantling the liberal democratic state and entrenching the long-term rule of 
the dominant party” (Pech and Scheppele 2017a:10). Clearly, these processes also destabilise 
the system of EU law, which is built on the understanding that both the EU institutions and the 
Member States respect the rule of law. 
The key question for European institutions is how to distinguish cases involving rule of law 
violations from other cases in which Member States fail to fulfil their obligations under the 
Treaties. This paper posits that rule of law violations could be characterised by their systemic 
nature – they are caused by systemic changes of law and they cause systemic damage to the 
legal system of a Member State. Although these changes are officially justified by some ‘worthy 
purposes’, they disguise the main political objective of the ruling majority, which is 
consolidation and perpetuation of power. Thus, rule of law violations could be identified by 
their results – the removal of limitations on power and political capture of all public institutions, 
including constitutional courts, ordinary courts, the prosecutor’s office and public media. A 
potential rule of law violation is given in the example of laws threatening judicial independence 
in Poland (see Box 1). 
Unlike other types of infringements of treaty law, rule of law violations consist of legal 
enactments in a Member State that authorise arbitrary decisions of the ruling majority with the 
effect of turning the rule of law into the rule of man. It is also emblematic that such enactments 
may seem to incorporate neutral or even benevolent changes if considered in isolation, or if 
compared with solutions in other Member States without a deeper understanding of 
constitutional traditions or existing practices (i.e. the system of judicial appointments or the 
role of judicial councils). However, if viewed in context or compared against the background of 
the internal system of checks and balances in other Member States, they appear to be 
intentionally designed to serve particularistic interests of the ruling majority. Therefore, we 
argue, the assessment of rule of law compliance in the EU needs to be based on objective 
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standards, the same for all Member States, but contextualised, taking into account the 
particularities of a given legal system, as well as unwritten conventions and practices that act 
as additional safeguards for the separation of powers.   
Although each case involving a rule of law violation is different, what distinguishes such cases 
from other breaches of treaty law is that the government responsible for rule of law backsliding 
does not acknowledge a problematic legal measure or policy as a breach. Instead it is likely to 
call such a measure or policy part of the national constitutional identity (Śledzińska-Simon and 
Ziółkowski, 2017). Furthermore, what distinguishes rule of law violations from other ‘regular’ 
infringements of fundamental rights are the absolute lack of effective legal remedies to tackle 
the issue at the national level. 
From the perspective of EU institutions, the most problematic aspect of rule of law backsliding 
concerns attacks by populist governments on the judiciary through measures dismantling the 
system of checks and balances that safeguard the independence of courts and judges. These 
attacks threaten the rule of law in two ways: first, they endanger the independence and 
impartiality of courts; and second, they put at risk the realisation of the right to a fair trial. The 
consequences of such attacks for EU law are twofold. The removal of certain institutional or 
procedural guarantees of the independence of courts and judges undermines the effective 
enforcement of EU law. Additionally, it undermines the effective protection of fundamental 
rights in the Member States to the extent that they hinge on judicial protection, and specifically 
on access to a fair trial by an independent court.  
Box 1. Judicial independence in Poland  
In recent years Poland’s Parliament has adopted several packages of new laws changing, among 
others, the procedure for judicial appointments, the disciplinary procedure for judges and the 
structure of the Supreme Court. It has also introduced a new retirement age for Supreme Court 
judges. These changes have allowed those in power (the executive or the parliamentary majority) 
to dominate the selection of members of the National Council of the Judiciary in charge of judicial 
appointments, take control of the disciplinary proceedings and de facto remove Supreme Court 
judges who reached the new retirement age, including the president of the Supreme Court.  
It is obvious that all the above legislative changes have a systemic character and should be 
addressed as such (see Matczak 2018). Tackling only one selected issue, which is the adoption of 
national measures lowering the retirement age of Supreme Court judges in office (see pending 
case C-619/18 R Commission v Poland), clearly does not settle the systemic problem of the lack 
of de jure and de facto independence of judges. Although the European Commission has also 
sent a formal notice to the Polish government concerning the new disciplinary regime for judges, 
the root of the problem lies with the new rules of selection of judicial members for the National 
Council of the Judiciary, which have led to the politicisation of this body. Still, the challenge to 
the national system of judicial appointments seems to go beyond the competence of the EU, 
unless EU institutions examine these new rules in view of the common standards recognised by 
the Venice Commission, the European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary or the Consultative 
Council of European Judges, and establish their derogatory effects on judicial independence and 
the right to a fair trial. 
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Yet, the current approach of European institutions is either to deny that problems with the 
judicial independence in a Member State have implications for the protection of fundamental 
rights in the EU or to address them exclusively as a fundamental rights issue (see C-286/12 
Commission v Hungary). We believe that European institutions should see the implications of 
fundamental rights protection in all alleged violations of the rule of law. At the same time, they 
should not view rule of law violations solely as an infringement of fundamental rights because 
this approach is often too narrow to show the harm done to the entire legal system. 
We claim that the protection of fundamental rights is intrinsically related to the rule of law. 
First, and most importantly, limitations of fundamental rights need to be provided for by laws 
that meet the democratic standards of lawmaking. Second, individuals should be able to enjoy 
their rights without any discrimination. And third, to make fundamental rights work in practice, 
individuals should be able to avail themselves of legal (procedural) remedies to enforce them 
or challenge their limitations in courts. Although the ‘justiciability’ of legal rights, i.e. the ability 
to claim particular individual rights in courts, is not the only measure of their social (moral) 
value, it is clearly an important achievement of the modern era of human rights protection (see 
Osiatyński 2009:37).  
The implication for fundamental rights protection in cases involving rule of law violations does 
not mean that the EU extends its powers under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (contrary to the wording of Article 51(2) of the Charter). Instead it means that 
EU institutions may invoke the Charter in cases concerning rule of law backsliding to support 
the argument about the systemic effects of the infringement. Therefore, the invocation of the 
Charter in cases of rule of law violations does not expand application of the Charter beyond the 
scope of EU law, but substantiates the claim about the systemic character of a breach of 
Member States’ obligations stemming from the Treaties (such as the obligation to respect the 
rule of law under Article 2 TEU).  
We propose to use rule of law infringement procedures against national measures that are 
relevant for the enforcement of EU law, even if they do not formally implement EU law. They 
could be applied to cases concerning media law or rules on electoral campaigns where the EU 
does not have legislative competences. Still, to the extent these areas are crucial for the 
enforcement of EU law, such as the organisation of elections to the European Parliament, and 
for the realisation of fundamental rights in the EU, the Member States need to follow the 
common standards – that is, to ensure legality, legal certainty, equality before the law and non-
discrimination, and access to courts.  
2. The EU’s rule of law toolkit 
Under current treaty law, the EU has two main options to tackle rule of law violations in the 
Member States. It may initiate infringement proceedings in pursuance of Article 258 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or trigger the mechanism of Article 7 
TEU relying predominantly on decisions by political institutions. As noted by Advocate General 
(AG) Evgeni Tanchev in C-619/18 R Commission v Poland, Article 7 TEU and Article 258 TFEU 
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could be invoked at the same time. They are separate procedures, set out in different provisions 
of the Treaties, based on a different scheme and serve a different purpose.  
Article 7 TEU is essentially a ‘political’ procedure to combat a Member State’s ‘serious 
and persistent breach’ of the values set out in Article 2 TEU, subject to high thresholds, 
and may lead to the suspension of the Member State’s membership rights including its 
participation rights. Article 258 TFEU constitutes a direct ‘legal’ route before the Court 
for ensuring the enforcement of EU law by the Member States, and is aimed at 
obtaining a declaration of infringement and may also lead to the imposition of financial 
penalties in the procedure set out in Article 260 TFEU, with a view to encouraging the 
Member State concerned to terminate the infringing conduct. These differences 
reflect the autonomous, indeed complementary, nature of these procedures and that 
they may apply in parallel. (Opinion, para. 50) 
Infringement proceedings are simultaneously narrower and broader than Article 7 procedures. 
While the former must involve an EU law element, the latter may also cover matters falling 
outside the scope of EU law (see Kochenov and Pech 2015). However, the infringement 
procedure may be employed to tackle any failure within EU law of whatever gravity, whereas 
the Article 7 TEU mechanism is there to address a “serious” or a “serious and persistent” breach 
of values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, including the rule of law. Taking into account the nature 
of such a breach, Hillion (2016) talks about the complementarity of the two actions where “in 
the case of the infraction procedure, the failure is more limited and circumstantial, whereas in 
the context of Article 7 TEU, the breach becomes systematic”.  
We claim that the two procedures not only could, and should, be invoked at the same time, but 
also that infringement procedures are to be applied to systemic violations of the rule of law. 
Overall, experience teaches that the infringement procedure is a much more effective tool than 
political actions in restraining a Member State involved in rule of law backsliding. In addition, 
taking into consideration the pool of possible legal actions, the infringement procedure is much 
better suited to addressing systemic violations of the rule of law than preliminary rulings. The 
former may end with a finding that certain laws or practices are not compatible with EU law, 
while the latter procedure usually leaves the final assessment to national authorities that may 
not be in a position to adequately weigh the gravity of the systemic problems.  
In this regard, one could compare the potential of the infringement procedure in the Polish 
judicial purge case to tackle the issue of judicial independence discussed in the preliminary 
ruling in the Celmer case (see Box 2). In this case, the CJEU suggested a test for whether the 
principle of mutual recognition could be suspended due to judicial capture in Poland, but failed 
to adequately resolve the question referred by the Irish court. Against this background, we 
argue that judicial independence, as a crucial element of the rule of law, should be considered 
either existent or not, rather than left to the individualised assessments of national courts in 
other Member States. 
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Box 2 .The Celmer controversy 
This issue emerged in the Celmer case (C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM), 
referred to the CJEU by the Irish court with regard to a surrender request issued by a Polish court. 
In this case the CJEU had to consider whether the lack of judicial independence in Polish courts, 
threatening the realisation of the right to a fair trial, should lead to the postponement of 
surrenders. For AG Evgeni Tanchev, the lack of independence and impartiality of a court in a 
Member State can be regarded as amounting to a flagrant denial of justice only if it is so serious 
that it destroys the fairness of the trial. Whereas the CJEU did not follow the extremely high 
flagrant denial of justice test (Bárd and van Ballegooij 2018), it required case-by-case examination 
of whether there is a real risk of a breach of the right to a fair trial (and hence it followed the 
application of the two-stage test established earlier in Aranyosi and Căldăraru). Both positions 
imply that judicial independence is a matter of scale rather than a zero-sum game.  
We disagree with the AG and the CJEU. Judicial independence can be implemented in many ways. 
One needs to acknowledge that the “[c]onstitutional design [of] the appointment, promotion, 
and removal of judges is surprisingly diverse and inconclusive” (Sajó and Uitz 2017:154). There 
is, however, a European consensus on a number of issues: critical for the institutional separation 
of the judiciary is the system of judicial appointments, advancement and disciplinary 
proceedings, as well as rules determining removal from office. Once there are no effective 
safeguards against incursions of the executive in these areas, it makes little sense, especially from 
the perspective of individuals seeking remedies in courts or facing a criminal trial, to determine 
how far a Member State restrains independence of courts and judges. In this vein, it is worrying 
that in the Celmer case, the CJEU made a categorical mistake: it interpreted the case solely as a 
violation of the right to a fair trial and asked the executing court deciding on a surrender to 
engage in an assessment of the degree of an infringement of this right. 
 
Still, even the infringement procedure has its obvious shortcomings. It depends on the 
European Commission as to whether to initiate an action and how to formulate its claim. 
Paradoxically, in cases involving rule of law violations the initiation of the infringement 
procedure could already be regarded as irrefutable proof that legal problems could not have 
been remedied in the domestic setting because the institutions that were supposed to uphold 
the rule of law or serve as checks on those in power were not capable of doing so, possibly 
because they have been captured by the political majority. In other words, the judicial phase 
of the infringement procedure signals that the Commission and the Member State concerned 
are not on the same page as regards the foundational values they are supposed to share, 
respect and promote.  
This observation reveals a further paradox – a legal action in cases involving rule of law 
violations puts the European Commission on an unequal footing vis-á-vis a Member State 
against which such an action is launched. In trying to restore respect for the rule of law in a 
Member State violating it, the European Commission needs to strictly abide by rule of law 
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standards, including the principle of legality, which requires that its own actions are based on 
law and do not exceed the powers granted by the Treaties. 
3. A proposal on how to use the infringement procedure for rule of law violations 
In this section, we argue that there is great potential in the infringement procedure to tackle 
rule of law issues in the Member States, provided that the following rules are applied.  
First, the European Commission should call a spade a spade, and name the rule of law problem 
explicitly.  
Second, the European Commission should not waste time and postpone its legal actions, while 
a Member State openly violates the rule of law. Whereas dialogue and tolerance are European 
virtues, experience teaches that there is no reason to engage in a lengthy discursive process 
with a government charged with rule of law backsliding (here we follow a definition of the 
concept as described by Pech and Scheppele, 2017a), i.e. a government that neither shares the 
same vocabulary of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, nor wants to engage in 
good faith in a constructive dialogue.  
Third, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) should automatically prioritise and 
accelerate infringement cases involving a rule of law element. This proposition builds upon the 
pilot judgment procedure of the European Court of Human Rights. We argue that all 
infringement procedures in which the Commission invites the CJEU to deal with a systemic 
problem caused by a rule of law violation should be expedited to avoid more harm being done 
by those in power. 
Fourth, interim measures may be used to put an immediate halt to rule of law violations that 
can culminate in grave and irreversible harm. We argue that even an accelerated process will 
often not be fast enough to prevent a systemic violation of the rule of law. In cases where an 
infringement procedure is pending, the European Commission should request, if relevant, 
interim measures to be ordered by the CJEU. 
Fifth, we urge European institutions to establish a rule of law mechanism. It should be a regular, 
possibly annual supervisory mechanism, based on a contextual analysis of national laws and 
policies, a scientifically proven methodology, objective standards and equal treatment of 
Member States. It would relieve the European Commission and the CJEU of some legitimacy 
problems and help to determine whether there is a systemic threat to the rule of law in a given 
Member State.  
3.1 Calling a spade a spade 
Our first proposition is that rule of law issues must be named as such. An adequate formulation 
of a legal problem is already half its solution. And vice versa: asking the wrong legal question 
inevitably dooms the outcome of the case. When targeting individual issues, it is more difficult 
to recognise the systemic attacks on the rule of law. It would therefore be beneficial for the 
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Commission to take up Scheppele’s (2015) suggestion and bundle cases with similar root 
causes. Or, the Member States should be invited to do the same along Kochenov’s (2015) biting 
intergovernmentalism theory, which suggests using direct actions by Member States against 
other Member States violating the rule of law.  
In view of the recent proactive role of the European Parliament in tackling rule of law 
backsliding, the possibility of initiating legal proceedings in such cases might also be granted to 
the only democratically elected EU institution. But even in the absence of such an approach, 
the rule of law element, when present, should be expressly acknowledged and accordingly 
tackled. The misconstruction of the Hungarian judicial capture (see Box 3) as a case of age 
discrimination serves as an illustration of the mistake of not calling rule of law backsliding by its 
name. 
Box 3. The Hungarian judicial retirement case 
In Hungary, in 2011, the judicial retirement age of 70 was lowered to the general retirement age. 
At the time, judges who reasonably expected that they could work until 70 were forced to retire 
at the age of 62 with immediate effect, and – unlike in other professions – without the discretion 
of the employer. Towards the end of 2012, upon pressure from the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, the Venice Commission and the CJEU, the government agreed to rehire retired judges 
between 62 and 70 if they wished to continue working. At the same time, judges who had been 
forced to retire illegally received compensation for the period of their forced retirement and if 
they opted for staying in retirement, they also benefited from compensation equalling 12 months 
of their last salary. Most judges were financially considerably better off by opting for the latter 
option. This was the reason why most judges went for the compensation scheme. After this 
settlement the matter was essentially mute. While EU officials – including then EU Justice 
Commissioner Viviane Reding – praised Hungary for respecting the judgment of the CJEU, holding 
that the mandatory early retirement of Hungarian judges had amounted to age discrimination 
(see C-286/12 - Commission v Hungary), in reality the most experienced judges were ultimately 
removed from the judiciary.  
Technically – since the Commission wanted to play safe in terms of legal grounds – the case was 
misconstrued as an age discrimination case, without any mention of Article 19(1) TEU or Article 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, albeit the controversy was essentially about judicial 
independence, and thus the rule of law. In the end, court packing was finalised in broad daylight, 
the proceedings in front of the EU institutions went on for 10 months and the infringement 
procedure could neither prevent nor remedy the situation. 
3.2 No room for a discursive approach 
Whatever procedure is followed to enforce the rule of law, we argue that there is no reason to 
waste too much time by deliberation, debate and discussion, once the problem areas have 
been established in a thorough, contextual, qualitative analysis, along with objective 
assessment, equal treatment of the countries and scientific rigour. The government in question 
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should of course be given time to present its arguments and interpretation of the problems, 
but prolonged procedures with extended deadlines after the previous ones have been ignored 
by a Member State concerned do not make much sense.  
As the application of the rule of law framework vis-à-vis Poland proved, there is no reason to 
presume the good intentions of a power capturing state institutions to engage in a sunshine 
approach involving a dialogue and soft measures. Such a government is unlikely to return to 
the concept of limited government (Sajó, 1999)– a notion that those in power wished to 
abandon in the first place. Even though we focus on infringement procedures in the present 
paper, the lessons learned from the rule of law framework (see Box 4) should be taken into 
account in all types of procedures tackling rule of law backsliding. 
Box 4. The rule of law framework 
The EU rule of law framework, a preliminary step before triggering Article 7 TEU, was created by 
the Commission back in 2014. As EU law scholars predicted (see Kochenov and Pech 2015 or Bárd 
and Carrera 2017), the application of the framework was bound to fail mostly because of its 
underlying faith in a discursive approach to tackle rule of law backsliding. Upholding and 
promoting EU values through a “sunshine policy” as Toggenburg and Grimheden (2016) 
proposed, “which engages and involves rather than paralyses and excludes”, presupposes that 
Member States in question will act in good faith and play by the rules, i.e. accept the validity of 
European norms and values and the power of European institutions to supervise these. If this is 
not the case, the procedure will just turn into a “dialogue of the deaf” as Pech and Scheppele 
(2017b) put it, and what is more, it will allow the rogue government to gain more time to 
implement its masterplan of judicial capture and create irreversible facts on the ground. After 
months of fruitless negotiations, the Commission formalised its concerns in its Opinion of 1 June 
2016, and a complementary recommendation was adopted on 21 December 2016, which gave 
the Polish government another two months to comply. Unsurprisingly, the Polish government 
failed to respect EU demands; instead it challenged the legitimacy and objectivity of the process, 
downplayed its importance and crucially entirely captured the Constitutional Tribunal. Another 
seven months later, on 26 July 2017, the Commission could only report that the 
recommendations had been disregarded and several other measures had been introduced to 
capture ordinary courts, too. 
3.3 Expedited rule of law procedures 
Even if rule of law problems are tackled as such, and no redundant ‘dialogue’ is conducted, 
wasting time will help governments to complete constitutional capture. But court proceedings 
are often protracted. Slowness is in their nature. The Luxembourg court is no exception. The 
average duration of preliminary ruling proceedings, for example, is about 15-16 months, but 
infringement proceedings – which are relevant for rule of law matters – on average take 40 
months.  
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This is a major drawback given the gravity of the harm that can be done to a legal system of the 
Member State. The forcible judicial retirement cases addressed by the Court thus far have been 
tackled in expedited procedures, but not all rule of law infringement cases are accelerated. In 
some cases, urgency could have helped, especially in conjunction with interim relief (see the 
next point), either by offering appropriate (interim) remedies or by making the violations 
obvious, thus offering ammunition for other types of rule of law mechanisms.  
We therefore argue that the European Commission and, if the case reaches the judicial phase, 
the CJEU should automatically take into account the gravity of the possible consequences of 
rule of law violations, the scale of its effects and the fact that time is on the side of those 
violating the rule of law. In the democratic world, procedural law takes the gravity of the 
problem and the importance of time into consideration in various types of special proceedings. 
Should someone be detained, or if the controversy involves children who are by nature more 
vulnerable, processes are accelerated or given priority.  
Our reasoning is similar: the considerable delay in rendering judgments in rule of law-related 
cases may culminate in irreversible and severe harm by rule of law backsliding, which the final 
judgment rendered in the far future would not be able to remedy. Once the constitution is 
rewritten, institutions that were supposed to serve as checks on the those in power are 
weakened and individuals loyal to the government are appointed to key positions, it becomes 
extremely difficult to make a U-turn and restore the rule of law, and even more challenging to 
explain the necessity of this change to the people. It is also questionable whether a new 
government would return to the rule of law, or keep at least some elements of the system that 
enable abuse of power. 
There are also collateral issues. By the time the potentially negative assessment is published, 
the state scrutinised might have changed its laws or practices, and require another analysis and 
evaluation. The new laws adopted or practices introduced may be equally substandard, and 
continue to harm the legal system until yet another assessment becomes public. Also, the legal 
consequences attached to a negative assessment may lose their impact over time. Criminal 
lawyers and criminologists are well aware of the fact that it is not the gravity of the criminal 
sanction but its inevitability and proximity to the crime committed that have a deterrent effect. 
The same applies to states. Just as criminal sanctions, determinations of rule of law 
infringements should have a dissuasive effect.  
Accordingly, we propose the following. Once an infringement case has an identifiable rule of 
law element, it should automatically be decided in an accelerated proceeding. Technically, such 
a process should be triggered if the Commission invokes Article 2 TEU. At a minimum, if Article 
2 in conjunction with Article 19 TEU on the principle of effective legal protection to be afforded 
by Member States under EU law is invoked, the special procedural rules discussed above should 
apply. This also corresponds to the CJEU’s judgment in the case of Associação Sindical dos Juízes 
Portugueses, which as Laurent Pech and Sébastien Platon (2018) put it, is “the most important 
judgment on the rule of law since Les Verts, where the Court essentially establishes a general 
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obligation for Member States to guarantee and respect the independence of their national 
courts and tribunals”.  
Nevertheless, this narrow approach to rule of law backsliding – albeit safe in terms of legal 
grounds – will not address its spillover effects on fundamental rights and freedoms. One should 
not lose sight of attacks on public watchdog organisations, such as the press or NGOs, academic 
freedom and mass surveillance, just to name a few real-life examples from EU Member States 
that accompany rule of law backsliding. 
Accelerating cases involving any potential rule of law violation has the danger of being 
overbroad, and constructing cases vaguely related to the rule of law as rule of law cases. But 
given the fact that infringement procedures are typically initiated by the Commission, some 
self-restraint could be expected. Every year, the Commission publishes its annual report on 
monitoring the application of EU law. Based on their analyses dating back to 2010, 2017 was 
the only year in which the Commission launched infringement procedures with reference to a 
violation of the rule of law. Out of the 48 new infringement cases initiated that year in the field 
of ‘justice and consumers’, only 2 were associated with the rule of law as the main policy 
matter. These cases are related to Poland, for having breached EU law when reorganising the 
court system on the one hand (infringement number 20172119), and to Hungary for having 
imposed administrative burdens on foreign-funded civil society organisations on the other 
(infringement number 20172110). Though the 2018 report is not yet available, Poland has a 
strong chance of being mentioned under the heading of the rule of law again for the alleged 
violation of the independence of the Supreme Court. Another important aspect of the 3 cases 
mentioned is that they all affect the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Box 5. Lex CEU 
The Hungarian government’s attacks on academic freedom serve as a sad illustration showing 
how time is on the side of those responsible for rule of law backsliding. The 2017 modification to 
the law on higher education can be seen as a general attack on academic freedom in Hungary, 
but practically it is singling out and targeting the Central European University (CEU). CEU is now 
about to fall victim to the Hungarian government’s illiberal project and the prime minister’s 
personal vendetta against the university founder, George Soros, a philanthropist promoting the 
concept of an open society. As with most tools used in state capture, the means to chase CEU 
out of Hungary also have a veneer of legality. The law referenced in the press as Lex CEU 
incorporates a number of requirements. Let us examine one of them.  
Lex CEU was passed to make sure that foreign universities – and CEU is originally accredited in 
the US – will only be able to function in Hungary if the operation is backed by an 
intergovernmental agreement between Hungary and the respective other country where its 
programmes are accredited. CEU satisfied all the conditions of the law, but the above-mentioned 
requirement is beyond its control. The issue of whether CEU could continue its operations in 
Hungary is thus at the mercy and the political discretion of two governments – one of which is 
openly hostile to the university, and which refuses to sign the respective agreement. Since no 
agreement was reached by the government within its self-imposed deadline, the national 
Educational Authority can withdraw the foreign educational institution’s licence any time.  
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The Commission started an infringement procedure in relation to the law, and decided to refer 
it to the CJEU in December 2017, but no judgment has been rendered since then, nor have 
interim measures been requested. The case is essentially mute, since – lacking an international 
agreement supporting its continued operation in Budapest – in December 2018 CEU declared 
that it will be forced to launch most of its programmes in Vienna in September 2019. 
 
Possible legal bases for fast-track rule of law procedures 
The Statute of the CJEU (in Article 23(a)) and the CJEU’s Rules of Procedure make acceleration 
of court procedures possible. The expedited procedure for preliminary rulings (Articles 105-6 
Rules of Procedure), the expedited procedure for direct actions (Articles 133-136 Rules of 
Procedure) and the urgent preliminary ruling procedures in the area of freedom, security and 
justice (Articles 107-114 Rules of Procedure) deserve attention. In addition, priority treatment 
(Article 53(3) Rules of Procedure) should be referenced.  
The accelerated or expedited procedures, as the names indicate, simply accelerate the speed 
of the ordinary proceedings. The president of the Court sets a deadline of a maximum of 15 
days for written observations. The president may also restrict the matters that parties may 
address to points of law. The expedited procedure for preliminary rulings and that for direct 
actions are very similar, except that the former may be requested by the referring court, while 
the latter by the applicant or defendant. They can both be applied to urgent cases: the referring 
court needs to show that a decision within a short period of time is necessary, so as to avoid a 
risk that could incur if the ordinary procedure were applied.  
Court practice has acknowledged the urgency in cases where there has been a risk of 
irreversible consequences that could be avoided if the procedure were accelerated, if these 
were of significance at the EU level or if the national procedure had been accelerated. 
Irreversible harm has been acknowledged by the courts in cases involving deprivation of liberty, 
limitations to the right to family life and cases where the enjoyment of an EU right could be 
rendered ineffective due to the lapse of time. The EU element has been recognised in a variety 
of cases, when the economic and monetary union has been at stake; with regard to the 
European arrest warrant regime; the fight against terrorism; and asylum, immigration and 
border control. 
The so-called urgent preliminary ruling procedure enables the Court to deal with a preliminary 
reference that addresses issues in the frame of the area of freedom, security and justice in an 
urgent procedure. The exceptional process can be initiated by the national court referring a 
case to the Court or by the Court itself. The urgent preliminary ruling procedure has three 
distinctive features as compared with the accelerated procedure. First, only the parties to the 
case, the Member State of the referring court, the Commission and other institutions 
concerned by the case may participate in the written procedure. Since these do not have 
language barriers, i.e. understand the language of the parties, the procedure can be faster than 
the ordinary one. Second, cases are dealt with by a chamber of the Court specifically designated 
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for these purposes. Third, communication, as a general rule, is conducted via electronic 
channels.  
According to a 2011 report on the use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, on average 
cases were decided within 66 days, and there was no case where the procedure exceeded 3 
months. Two types of cases can be singled out where the Court delivered its judgments within 
the shortest possible times: where there was a risk of irreparable damage to a parent–child 
relationship, and where a person was being detained and further detention depended on the 
Court’s answer to a legal issue. In other words, where there is irreversible harm or gross human 
rights limitations (and by definition detention cases qualify as such) the urgent preliminary 
ruling procedure is used. 
Finally, priority treatment may be granted to certain cases by the president of the Court if 
special circumstances apply. Although priority may be given to any type of proceeding before 
the CJEU, the procedural rules are not modified in any way in such cases. Whereas the average 
length of the expedited procedure is about 6 months (even though it has been steadily growing 
in recent years) and that of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure a little more than 2 months, 
priority treatment is much less advantageous, since its average length is 1.5 years, but given 
the diverse nature and complexity of cases prioritised, they can last anytime between 8 and 48 
months.  
3.4 Interim measures  
Typically, even a fast-track infringement procedure will not be prompt enough to prevent the 
harm that rule of law violations may cause to a legal system. Therefore, interim measures 
should be ordered in infringement procedures involving a rule of law element. Carrera and 
Faure Atger (2010) proposed this back in 2010 in relation to prevention of the political conflict 
over the so-called Roma affair between the EU institutions and a Member State. They called 
for  
a new ‘freezing enforcement procedure’ (complementing existing ones), in cases 
where there is evidence that certain national measures are in violation of EU law and 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This pre-emptive procedure would have the 
effect of immediately freezing the practical application of the contested national 
practice until the European Commission had decided upon the formal launching of the 
infringement and/or fundamental rights proceedings and had reached a formal 
decision on their lawfulness and compatibility with European law and fundamental 
rights.  
In mutual recognition cases, scholars like Carrera and Mitsilegas (2018) pushed for a freezing 
mechanism and indeed in Aranyosi and Căldăraru and Celmer (C-216/18 PPU Minister for 
Justice and Equality v LM) the CJEU also allowed and even obliged national executing courts to 
suspend surrender, until the potential human rights violations in the issuing state are confirmed 
or rebutted. So as not to overburden the judiciary, Bárd and van Ballegooij (2018) went one 
step further and argued that surrender cases should be frozen by the national courts, “awaiting 
RULE OF LAW INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURES: A PROPOSAL TO EXTEND THE EU’S RULE OF LAW TOOLBOX | 15 
 
a resolution of the matter from political actors in accordance with the procedure provided for 
in Article 7 TEU or the DRF monitoring and enforcement mechanism called for by the European 
Parliament” (see section 3.5). 
An interim measure has been invoked in a recent infringement case, in the infamous Białowieża 
forest affair for logging trees at the UNESCO-protected NATURA 2000 site. In Białowieża, 
pending the judgment in the main proceedings, the CJEU ordered Poland to stop the logging. 
The Polish response was an intensified cutting of trees, and additionally, the government even 
asked for the forest in question to be removed from the UNESCO World Heritage List. In order 
to create more incentives for Poland to follow the interim measure, the CJEU decided that 
penalty payments would be imposed on Poland if the government failed to comply with the 
interim measure immediately and fully. As Koncewicz (2018) argued, the case “shows that the 
Treaties do contain legal tools to respond to the recalcitrant member states riding roughshod 
over the core values and principles of the EU legal order”. 
In order to prevent more harm being done to the rule of law, and in line with the precautionary 
principle, we argue for interim measures suspending the given national policies under the 
threat of dissuasive fines, putting a halt to rule of law violations until corresponding cases are 
decided on their merits (see Box 6). The precautionary principle is a policy-making strategy: 
whenever an activity might result in harm or injustice, measures should be taken to prevent 
this, even if the exact effect of the discussed steps on the possible harm are not fully established 
scientifically. 
In Poland there are currently no domestic remedies that could be effectively used to counteract 
unconstitutional laws, policies or practices. That is because the ruling majority has captured a 
majority of judges on the Constitutional Tribunal, which has turned into an ally of the 
government (see Sadurski, 2018), while the constitutional accountability of current 
officeholders remains out of the question for political reasons (at least during this 
parliamentary term). Hence, all constitutionally dubious legal acts – such as the amended Act 
on the National Council of the Judiciary, the Act on the Supreme Court and the Act on the 
system of ordinary courts – enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and remain legally valid. 
While their legitimacy is at the lowest ebb, they are part of binding law. As a result, they are 
followed and abided by those who remain faithful to the rule of law (like some of the judges 
who silently accepted their removal or requested the president of Poland to extend their 
service). The remedy may thus only come from EU institutions.  
Box 6. Interim measures in case C-619/18 R and the national response 
The Commission initiated its infringement action against Poland in October 2018 and asked the 
CJEU to order interim measures before rendering a judgment. In this case – C-619/18 R 
Commission v Poland – the Commission alleged that the lowering of the retirement age for 
Supreme Court judges to 65 without a meaningful transitional period and granting the president 
of Poland the discretion to extend the active judicial service of Supreme Court judges was a 
violation of EU law. The legal claim was based on Article 19(1) TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter 
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of Fundamental Rights. Hence, unlike the Hungarian case of early judicial retirement, the Polish 
modifications to the law were not constructed as a case concerning age discrimination of judges, 
but as a violation of fundamental rights of those who are “recipients of justice” delivered by 
courts. 
On 19 October 2018 the Court issued its (provisional) interim order. It mandated a retrospective 
suspension of the Act on the Supreme Court with regard to the first president of the Supreme 
Court, as well as to the forcibly retired judges of both the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court. 
According to Article 279 TFEU, the CJEU may prescribe any necessary interim measures in any 
case before it. However, the interim measure ordered against Poland is a special kind. 
(Sarmiento, 2018) First, it was issued to suspend a statutory act of a Member State, and not an 
act of EU institutions. Second, it was issued in an urgent procedure based on Article 160(7) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the CJEU, which allows the president of the Court to grant the application 
of an interim measure before hearing the party concerned. In pursuance of Article 278 TFEU, 
actions brought before the CJEU do not have suspensory effect, unless the Court orders that 
application of the contested act is suspended. The interim measure decision was also particular 
because, contrary to the established case law, it was meant to restore the status of judges from 
before the infringement action was lodged (and a final decision of the Court rendered).  
Needless to say, the above-mentioned particularities sparked controversy at the domestic level 
on whether, when and how the interim measure should be complied with. Several politicians 
contested the legal basis of the interim measure, and urged the government to disregard it. For 
example, Krystyna Pawłowicz, an MP from the Law and Justice Party (PiS), called the CJEU 
decision “an attack on [the] sovereignty of a Member State”. In her view, the interim measure 
contravened the EU Treaties, as it intended to invalidate the statutory law of a Member State. 
She argued that interim measures could only have prospective effects and apply to individual 
measures rather than statutory acts. Others, such as the deputy director of the Chancellery of 
the President of the Republic claimed that the interim order was not self-executory. This position 
was also shared by Marcin Warchoł, the Deputy Minister of Justice, who stated that application 
of the interim measure requires a new statute.  
Taking the opposite stance are several renowned constitutional experts, like Professors Ewa 
Łętowska, Mirosław Wyrzykowski or Zbigniew Kmieciak, who recognise that the interim measure 
binds all Polish authorities and needs to be immediately applied, while its direct effect is a 
consequence of the primacy of EU law.  
In spite of these controversies, the interim measure had a domestic influence. For a start, the 
first president of the Supreme Court and the president of the Supreme Administrative Court 
called the judges who had been forced to retire to return to their offices and they followed this 
call. However, the government proceeded with amendments to the Act on the Supreme Court, 
in pursuit of which some judges did not resume work because they chose to take advantage of a 
preferable pension regime (securing 100% of their salaries). In addition, the National Council of 
the Judiciary has agreed to suspend the pending competition for positions on the Supreme Court 
that were forcibly vacated. Yet this means that the Council has interpreted the obligations stated 
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in the interim measure very narrowly – as an obligation not to fill the vacancies created by the 
challenged Act on the Supreme Court.  
On 21 November 2018, the PiS submitted a bill regarding the law on the Supreme Court in order 
to comply with the interim order. It restores the previous retirement age (70 instead of 65) for 
judges appointed before April 2018. Most importantly, the bill does not require the renewed 
appointment of judges who were forced to retire but declares that their service has not been 
interrupted. The bill also removes the power to grant permission to continue judicial service after 
judges reach the age of 65 from the president of Poland.  
The Polish justice minister considered that bill as a move to fulfil obligations stemming from EU 
law. “At the same time, we are pushing forwards with our changes in the justice system”, he also 
added. In a similar vein, the PiS chairman of the parliamentary justice committee stated: 
“Sometimes you have to take one step back to take two steps forwards. The reform will certainly 
be completed.” The bill was adopted in record speed (3.5 hours in the Lower Chamber, and 
approved in the Senate on the same day), and was signed into the law by the president.  
Today it is evident that the immediate response of the Polish government was a tactic used to 
please the moderate electorate of the PiS before the local government elections. In April 2019 
the government completed another phase of this project by introducing new amendments to 
the Act on the Supreme Court and to the disciplinary procedure for judges, by additionally 
curbing the rights of judges to a fair trial. 
 
It is pertinent that EU institutions not only remain vigilant and continue to closely follow the 
Polish government’s steps in complying with the interim measure, but also with its 
reconstruction of the judiciary in general. As Koen Lenaerts, President of the CJEU noted: a 
failure to comply with the Court’s decision is a step towards secession from the EU. A vision of 
‘Polexit’ is not as distant as it seems, given the recent move by Zbigniew Ziobro, the Minister of 
Justice and Prosecutor General, who requested the subservient Constitutional Tribunal to 
review the compatibility of Article 267(3) TFEU with the Polish Constitution, in order to pre-
empt further preliminary questions from Polish courts on issues related to judicial 
independence. (Biernat and Kawczyńska, 2018) From a substantive perspective, this would 
indeed serve as evidence that the foundational values enshrined in Article 2 TEU are no longer 
shared by Poland, but such a disregard is fatal also procedurally, as the EU thus far has not 
tested any other tools (and Article 7 TEU is too burdensome) to prevent the dismantling of the 
EU from within. 
3.5 An EU mechanism to enforce the rule of law 
When assessing whether a Member State is engaged in rule of law backsliding, the judiciary is 
overburdened, whereas political institutions – because of the high political threshold an Article 
7 TEU procedure requires – escape responsibility in enforcing common values altogether. 
Therefore, an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights – as 
proposed by the European Parliament and earlier by one of the authors of the present paper – 
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should be brought to life. A regular, possibly annual supervisory mechanism, based on a 
contextual analysis of national laws and policies, a scientifically proven methodology, objective 
standards and equal treatment of Member States, should be established.  
With such a mechanism in place, the EU could rely on its own sources to determine whether a 
Member State is in breach of common values. It could then warn the respective Member State 
in due time and request a return to these values. Also, if a Member State has already breached 
these values, EU institutions would not have to wait for external actors (like the European Court 
of Human Rights or the Venice Commission) to indicate generic problems with the rule of law 
but could use their own scoreboard system.  
The rule of law mechanism should follow a precautionary approach and be based on solid 
evidence and valid qualitative analysis. It could indicate when to start rule of law infringement 
procedures or whether it is necessary to request interim measures. Furthermore, it would allow 
the EU to act promptly and suspend the application of EU laws based on mutual recognition, 
and thus relieve courts of this burden. It could also indicate when mutual trust can be re-
established instead of leaving to the judiciary case-by-case decisions on this matter. It could 
establish higher standards than required by other international organisations, such as the 
Council of Europe, which includes countries with poor human rights records.  
Furthermore, the rule of law mechanism should ensure equal treatment of the Member States 
– something we do not see today, and for which the EU can justifiably be criticised. The regular 
reports would also keep the old topics alive. Now we are blinded by the ever more brutal 
attacks on EU values, and tend to forget that earlier problems have not been solved or 
sufficiently addressed. 
Box 7. Another aspect of the Celmer controversy 
The CJEU required the Irish court to seek evidence from Polish judges issuing a European arrest 
warrant to show that a fair trial can be ensured in a concrete case. This amounts to probatio 
diabolica. As Bárd and van Ballegooij (2018) have shown, the Court’s demand not only gives rise 
to “Herculean hurdles” in proving the impact of judicial capture on individual suspects, but it 
“mixes up the responsibilities of the Commission as guardian of the rule of law, of the European 
Council – which is now given the sole power to suspend mutual trust – and of individuals, who 
do not possess an apparatus demonstrating risks to their fundamental rights”. The actual Irish 
High Court judgment on Mr Celmer’s surrender applying the Luxembourg test proves that there 
is no way to meet the high threshold the CJEU created: even if the executing court has no doubt 
that judicial independence has ceased to exist in the issuing country, it will be bound to surrender 
the suspect or convict.  
Against this reasoning, a mere probability that a judge will act under pressure or the chilling effect 
of disciplinary proceedings related to the case at hand or other cases defies belief in judicial 
independence. Judges have to be and also need to appear to be independent. Unless a halt is 
put to the harm of judicial independence, the whole structure of adjudication at both the 
domestic and EU levels might be jeopardised. Most importantly, this probability should be 
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determined by an independent authority at the EU level (a special committee), and not a 
domestic court in another Member State. Once the committee establishes that a systemic 
problem with the rule of law exists which threatens the independence of courts and judges, 
surrender cases must be frozen, as proposed by Carrera and Mitsilegas (2018). 
4. Conclusions 
A mature constitutional system, built on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights, implies the existence of robust precautionary measures against anti-
constitutional tendencies and forces. These are designed to protect democracy against a 
‘constitutional coup d’état’, which may replace a constitutional government with an autocratic 
one. The blueprint for rule of law backsliding entails that election laws are curbed, 
constitutional courts captured, ordinary judges unduly influenced, media pluralism destroyed, 
participatory democracy dismantled, civil society harassed and several fundamental rights 
denied. To prevent this from happening European institutions need to make use of preventive 
tools, because once a constitutional regime is captured, the chances are slim that it can be 
restored.  
The concept of liberalism has been demonised in some Member States that want to claim their 
constitutional distinctiveness based on traditional (‘illiberal’ or conservative) values. But the EU 
should reject an understanding of respect for national constitutional identity that would include 
tolerating open disregard of the core principles of the rule of law. These principles underlie a 
concept of limited government, that is a government which respects the limits of the law. The 
concept of limited government is at odds with a party that denies the notion of liberal 
democracy and demolishes the internal system of checks and balances. Should a ruling majority 
in a Member State openly reject the concept of limited government, it is the beginning of the 
end of European integration.  
Since there is little chance that rule of law backsliding will be stopped from within, it is expected 
that international actors will help to restore the rule of law. We believe that it is now the 
responsibility of the EU to call the Polish and Hungarian governments to account for rule of law 
violations in the European court, not least to set an example for other Member States on the 
path of rule of law backsliding. EU action is imperative not only for the sake of keeping 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights alive in the respective Member States, but 
also for the EU as a whole.  
Should judicial independence be under threat in some Member States, we might arrive at a 
situation where the EU harbours countries that would not qualify for EU membership if they 
applied today. In addition, as Kochenov and Bárd (2018) have demonstrated, basic EU 
principles, such as autonomy, primacy and mutual trust, will be jeopardised unless EU law 
embraces the rule of law as an institutional ideal and takes Article 2 TEU values to heart in the 
context of the day-to-day functioning of the Union.  
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We have argued that the effective use of Article 7 TEU is not a viable option to put a halt to rule 
of law violations. Instead we see great potential in infringement procedures to ensure respect 
of the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. But infringement procedures are slow and 
therefore we propose solutions that take into consideration the gravity of possible harm and 
the low chance of repair from within. We suggest that rule of law violations should be tackled 
as a special kind of failure of Member States to fulfil obligations under the Treaties that 
necessitates a prompt response. 
In the above analysis we have come to the following conclusions. First, a rule of law violation 
should be named and legally addressed as such in the infringement procedure. Second, cases 
with a rule of law element should be dealt with promptly and automatically accelerated. Urgent 
preliminary proceedings may not be applicable to all rule of law issues, only to those relevant 
to the area of freedom, security and justice, whereas priority treatment does not in fact 
necessarily accelerate the process. Therefore, rule of law cases – those where the Commission 
invokes Article 2 TEU, or more specifically Article 2 TEU and relevant provisions of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights – should automatically be expedited. We also advise the use of interim 
measures to prevent further action by the government responsible for rule of law violations.  
When it comes to the actual assessment of the situation on the ground, we acknowledge that 
the rule of law can be achieved via various paths, but there is general agreement on when it is 
violated. In some cases, only a combination of acceleration and interim relief may be of help, 
while in others one of these measures may be sufficient. In the case of CEU, interim measures 
could not have helped, because there was nothing to be asked from the government, other 
than to suspend enforcement of the law curtailing academic freedom for another year or two. 
This would only have added more uncertainty about the future of the university. In this case, 
only a prompt EU response condemning attacks on academic freedom could have prevented 
the university from being chased out of Hungary.  
In the Polish judicial retirement case, a combination of accelerated proceedings and interim 
measures was necessary. Still, the harm has already been done, as the new Act on the Supreme 
Court entered into force on 3 April 2018, before the EU started to tackle the issue via legal 
means. Moreover, the judicial phase of the infringement procedure could not have been 
accelerated enough so as to render a final judgment on the merits before the government 
packed the Supreme Court with new appointees. Therefore, the tools need to be selected on a 
case-by-case basis.  
Finally, so as not to overburden the CJEU, and – borrowing from Judge Allan Rosas (2019) – to 
“honour its judicial mandate”, the rule of law toolbox should be extended by a rule of law 
mechanism that would help determine, against objective standards and a rigorous 
methodology, when a Member State engages in a systemic violation of the rule of law, giving 
the European Commission a green light to trigger ‘rule of law infringement procedures’ along 
the above proposed lines.  
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